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SECURITIES-STOCKLIST AUTHORIZATIONS-
Solicitation of Stocklist Authorizations Is 
Within the Proxy Regulations of the 
Securities Exchange Act-Studebaker 
Corp. v. Gittlin* 
[Vol. 65 
Gittlin, a shareholder of the Studebaker Corporation, planned 
to solicit proxies for the election of directors in opposition to the 
existing management. As an initial step in the implementation of 
this plan, he sought to obtain a stockholder's list and accordingly 
initiated proceedings in a New York court under section 1315(a) 
• 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
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of the New York Business Corporation Law which grants a right 
of access to a shareholder who has obtained authorizations in writ-
ing from the holders of at least five per cent of the outstanding 
shares of the corporation.1 In order to meet the five per cent re-
quirement, Gittlin had solicited and obtained authorizations from 
forty-two shareholders. Studebaker appeared before the Federal Dis-
trist Court for the Southern District of New York to secure an in-
junction against the use of these authorizations in the state court, 
and the injunction was issued since the court found that Gittlin had 
obtained the authorizations without complying with Securities Ex-
change Act Regulations 14a-32 and 14a-63• Gittlin, asserting that 
these proxy regulations do not apply to authorizations to obtain 
a stocklist in a state court proceeding, appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit. On appeal, held, affirmed. Since 
the authorizations were obtained as a part of a continuous plan 
intended to end in the solicitation of proxies, and were designed 
to prepare the way for such a solicitation, they are within the scope 
of the proxy regulations and therefore, absent compliance there-
with, they are invalid. 
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act4 authorizes the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate communica-
tions with shareholders when the purpose of such communications 
is to solicit any proxy, consent or authorization relating to any 
security registered under the Act. The courts, in order to further 
the broad purposes of the Act, have generally given a liberal inter-
pretation to the SEC's proxy regulation powers. The leading case 
illustrating this position is SEC v. Okin,5 which arose under a sim-
ilar grant of authority to the Commission to regulate proxies, the 
source of this grant however being section 12(e) of the Public Util-
ity Holding Company Act of 1935.6 In Okin, a defendant who was 
1. The statute also provides that if the shareholder himself owns 5% of the out-
standing shares, or if he has been a holder of record for more than six months, he 
qualifies for the same right of access. 
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a•3 (Supp. 1966). This regulation prohibits solicitation in the 
absence of a proxy statement containing specified information. 
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(c) (1964), as amended, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(c) (Supp. 
1966). This regulation requires that preliminary copies of the proxy material be filed 
with the SEC at least ten days prior to the date that definitive copies of such material 
are first sent or given to security holders, unless the Commission authorizes a shorter 
period. See note 31 infra and accompanying text. 
4. It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities 
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to 
solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other 
than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title. 
48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (Supp. 1965). 
5. 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943). 
6. It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or to permit the use of his or 
its name to solicit, by the use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of 
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planning to solicit proxies had sent a false and misleading letter 
to shareholders asking them not to sign any proxies for the com-
pany and to revoke any that had already been signed. The court 
rejected a possible narrow interpretation of the SEC's power--one 
that would have limited the application of the SEC regulations pro-
mulgated under section 12(e) only to solicitations of a proxy, au-
thorization, consent, or power of attorney-and instead extended 
the regulatory power of the SEC to cover any writings which are 
a "part of a continuous plan ending in solicitation and which pre-
pare the way for its success."7 This interpretation of the SEC's 
power under section 12(e) was subsequently deemed equally valid 
as to the power granted by section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. In 
SEC v. Topping,8 on facts similar to Okin, the court found the 
question moot, but nonetheless indicated that in a proper case it 
would apply the Okin standards to section 14(a) so that it could 
prevent a person planning to solicit proxies from distributing, with-
out complying with the proxy rules, letters allegedly containing 
false and misleading information. 
In 1956 the SEC amended Regulation 14a-l, and, as amended, 
the Regulation covers those communications which the holdings in 
Okin and Topping indicated were properly within the scope of 
the SEC's regulatory powers: a "solicitation" now includes "the fur-
nishing of [a] ... communication to security holders under circum-
stances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, with-
holding, or revocation of a proxy."9 The Regulation further defines 
interstate commerce, or otherwise, any proxy, power of attorney, consent, or 
authorization regarding any security of a registered holding company or a sub• 
sidiary company thereof in contravention of such rules and regulations or orders 
as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors or consumers or to prevent the circumvention of the 
provisions of this chapter or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder. 
49 Stat. 824 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79l(e) (1964). While this provision for proxy regulation 
is somewhat broader in scope than is § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, with respect to 
the problem here considered it is, in effect, the same. Sinclair Armstrong, chairman 
of the SEC, testified in 1955 that the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
contained proxy provisions similar to § 14(a), and that the former might properly 
be considered merely as an application to a specific industry of the general federal 
power which is contained in the Exchange Act. Hearings before a Subcommittee of 
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency-Stock Market Study, 84th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1508 (1955). But see Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1950), in which 
the court said that the SEC had the power to forbid a stockholder's protective com-
mittee from soliciting financial contributions from stockholders whom it represented 
in a reorganization proceeding under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935. The court stated that the Holding Company Act gave a stricter measure of con-
trol to the SEC than did the Exchange Act, and pointed to the language in the 
Holding Company Act which gives the SEC authority "to prevent the circumvention 
of the provisions of this title." The Okin decision, however, did not refer to this 
language. 
7. 132 F.2d at 786. 
8. 85 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-l(f)(iii) (1964). SEC Securities Exchange Act Release 
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a "proxy" as including "every proxy, consent or authorization with-
in the meaning of section 14(a) of the Act. The consent or authori-
zation may take the form of failure to object or to dissent."10 Since 
the necessity of complying with the other regulations promulgated 
under section 14(a) depends upon whether the communication in 
question constitutes a solicitation of a proxy within the meaning 
of Regulation 14a-l, these definitions are of considerable impor-
tance to anyone contemplating a communication with shareholders. 
The principal case represents an attempt by the SEC, at the 
urging of a private party, to extend its regulatory powers over 
solicitations so as to encompass attempts to obtain shareholders 
lists. While the policy considerations relevant to securities regula-
tion are generally quite different from those which are relevant to 
access to stocklists, the SEC has recently taken the position that 
regulating the dissemination of information to shareholders is of 
paramount importance and that therefore its expansive attitude is 
justified, even though it might in some circumstances conflict with 
other values.11 In the principal case, Gittlin maintained that the 
No. 5276, 21 Fed. Reg. 528 (1956), which announced the adoption of the 1956 amend-
ments, commented: 
Thus, statements made for the purpose of inducing security holders to give, re-
voke, or withhold a proxy with respect to a matter to be acted upon by security 
holders of an issuer, including election of directors, by any person who has solicited 
or intends to solicit proxies, whether or not such statements are accompanied by 
an express request to give, revoke, or withhold a proxy may involve a solicitation 
within the meaning of the regulation, depending upon the particular facts and 
circumstances. 
Prior to 1956, the definition of "solicitation" included: 
(1) any request for a proxy whether or not accompanied by or included in a 
form of proxy, (2) any request to execute or not to execute, or to revoke, a proxy, 
or (3) the furnishing of a form of proxy to security holders under circumstances 
reasonably calculated to result in the procurement of a proxy. 
17 Fed. Reg. 11431 (1952). 
IO. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-I(d) (1964). 
11. The SEC has recently attempted to regulate advertisements by a shareholder 
organization representing the shareholders of the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company. The advertisements, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1966, p. 57, 
col. 3, appearing in major newspapers, have opposed the Federal Communications 
Commission's present investigations of AT&:T's rates. The advertisements claim that 
this investigation has adversely affected the market value of AT&:T stock on the New 
York Exchange, and consequently the advertisers wish both to publicize the share-
holders' point of view and to solicit contributions and support for the organization. 
The SEC contends that the material should be cleared with the SEC before publica-
tion, since, in its opinion, the organization is at least soliciting from shareholders 
authority to make representations on their behalf before the FCC. The organization, 
on the other hand, denies that it is soliciting proxies or has any intention of doing 
so, and it claims that the attempted regulation challenges its right to free speech 
and to petition for redress of grievances. See The 'Wall Street Journal, Sept. 28, 1966, 
p. 6, col. 2. The most recent advertisements by the organization have specifically 
stated that a contribution to the organization does not constitute a proxy, consent, 
or authorization for the present or future, and that any conribution should be re-
garded simply as an indication that the shareholder wants to use the organization 
to exercise his "constitutional right to speak out." See, e.g., The Wall Street Journal, 
Oct. 20, 1966, p. 12, col. 4. 
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regulations apply only to authorizations relating to corporate deci-
sion making, and that therefore the 14a-1 definitions should not 
encompass authorizations which are obtained for the limited pur-
pose of qualifying under state law to obtain a stocklist; such author-
izations do not relate to corporate decision making and are given 
in advance of any such commitment. In developing his argument, 
Gittlin contended that "authorization" does not mean any kind of 
authorization, but rather only those conferring the power to vote-
either negatively or affirmatively.12 Furthermore, Gittlin urged that 
the language defining solicitation should not be construed to in-
clude a communication to a small group of shareholders for the 
limited purpose of obtaining a shareholder's list, even if the com-
munication is made pursuant to a plan to use the list to secure 
voting proxies from other shareholders.13 On the other hand, the 
SEC, appearing as amicus curiae, advised the court that it believed 
that the language of 14(a) and 14a-1 imposes no limitations on the 
normal meaning of proxy, consent, or authorization, and that the 
provisions of the proxy rules were designed to reach any situation 
in which a stockholder is requested to permit another to act for 
him.14 
The Second Circuit did not adopt either the broad interpreta-
tion urged by the SEC or the narrow construction advocated by 
Gittlin. Instead, it based its decision to uphold the order of the 
lower court squarely upon the authority and language of Okin. The 
court held that the authorizations in the principal case were "part 
of 'a continuous plan' intended to end in solicitation.''15 Indeed, 
the appellant had admitted as much.16 Therefore, the court rea-
soned, under Okin the investors were entitled to the information 
required by the proxy rules17 and to staff review of that informa-
tion18 before they could be asked to make a decision, even if the 
decision related only to stocklist authorizations. Curiously, the deci-
12. :Brief for Appellant, pp. 19-20. 
13. Id. at 19. 
14. While the SEC appeared at oral argument in order to express its view that 
the authorizations in question came within the proxy rules, it did not file a brief. 
This is apparently because Gittlin's action in the state court, Studebaker's counter-
action in the federal district court, and Gittlin's appeal from the injunction granted 
by the district court, all took place in a little more than a week. Since the case was 
heard on an accelerated schedule, the SEC had but short notice in advance of argu-
ment before the Second Circuit. The SEC, however, later sent the court a letter 
summarizing the position it had taken at oral argument. It is this letter to which 
the court refers when it states the SEC's position in footnotes 2 and 5. Principal 
case at 695-96 n.2, 698 n.5. 
15. Principal case at 696. 
16. :Brief for Appellant, p. 7. The appellant stated explicitly that he was planning 
to solicit proxies for the election of directors in opposition to management. 
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (Supp. 1966); see note 2 supra. 
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(c) (1964), as amended, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(c) (Supp. 
1966); see note 3 supra. 
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sion in Gittlin was, as far as the parties were concerned, only a mat-
ter of academic interest, for the New York court subsequently ruled 
that Gittlin's common law right to inspect the shareholder's list 
upon demonstration of proper purpose19 had not been pre-empted 
by the New York Business Corporation Law and that Gittlin was 
qualified under the common law.20 Nonetheless, in other circum-
stances the Gittlin decision might have important consequences. 
Nearly all jurisdictions have legislation dealing with access to 
stocklists. Generally, such legislation represents an attempt to curb 
unwarranted management resistance to inspection.21 Many juris-
dictions, like New York, have vested a statutory right to inspect in 
shareholders who have held corporate securities for a specified pe-
riod of time or have held a specified percentage of the outstanding 
shares.22 And, most of these jurisdictions, either by statute23 or, as 
19. E.g., Matter of Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 265, 53 N.E. ll03, II07 (1898). 
20. Gittlin v. Studebaker Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 964, 268 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
The result is consistent with the decision that N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 624, which 
deals with obtaining stocklists from domestic corporations, did not pre-empt common 
law. Sivin v. Schwartz, 22 App. Div. 2d 822, 254 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1964). N.Y. Bus. CoRP. 
LAw § 1315, deals with foreign corporations, but from the standpoint of pre-emption, 
the intent of the legislation would appear to be the same in both cases, that is, 
not to restrict the common law right but rather to supplement it. 
Apart from the problem of the state statute's pre-empting of the common law, 
another question which might have been asked is whether the common law or the 
state statute or both had been pre-empted by Regulation 14a-7 of the Proxy Rules, 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1964), which specifies that if management has made or intends 
to make any solicitation within the meaning of the rules it must either (1) furnish 
a list of the names and addresses of the holders of the particular security promptly 
upon the written request of any security holder entitled to vote on the matter, or 
(2) mail the proxy material for him. It appears that state rights to inspect stocklists 
have not been pre-empted by Regulation 14a-7. Alabama Gas v. Morrow, 265 Ala. 
604, 93 So. 2d 515 (1957); Application of Ditisheim, 96 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1950). 
If Regulation 14a-7 did pre-empt state law dealing with access to stocklists, then, unless 
management had solicited or intended to solicit proxies with respect to a particular 
matter, a stockholder could be effectively prevented from communicating with other 
stockholders about the issue in question. Smith v. Republic Pictures, 144 N.Y.S.2d 
142, 143 (Sup. Ct. 1955). Also, if management elected to mail the opponent share-
holder's proxy material, it would not have to mail that material prior to the time 
it mailed its own, and thus it would have the opportunity both to see what the 
opponent's position was, and to neutralize it with its own communications. There 
appear to be no comparable inroads made upon the rights of an insurgent under 
the law of any state. It has been held that to override the express savings provision 
contained in § 28(a) of the Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1963), 
legislative intent to this effect should be definitely expressed. See Crosby v. Weil, 
382 Ill. 538, 546-48, 48 N.E.2d 386, 390-91 (1943). Since there is no indication that 
Congress did intend to pre-empt the law relating to stocklists, it would seem that 
Regulation 14a-7 has properly been regarded as not pre-empting such state law. 
21. This is the conclusion reached by the editors of the annotated Model Act in 
a comment which states the reason underlying the legislation relating to access to 
corporate books and records. 2 ABA-ALI MODEL J3us. CoRP. Acr ANN. § 46, 11 4 
(1960). The same view is stated in Newman, Inspection of Stock Ledgers and Voting 
Lists, 16 Sw. L.J. 439, 441 (1962). 
22. E.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 46 (1953); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, 
§ 157.45 (Supp. 1965); TEXAS Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.44 (1956). 
23. Ibid. 
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in New York, by judicial decision, have even determined that access 
to stocklists is not necessarily to be limited to statutorily qualified 
shareholders-upon proof of proper purpose, other shareholders 
may also obtain the stocklists.24 However, in a few jurisdictions, 
access does appear to be restricted to applicants who can qualify 
under the statutes.25 Furthermore, most jurisdictions have con-
cluded that qualified shareholders, in spite of the apparently un-
conditional language of the statutes, do not have an absolute right 
of access to the lists.26 These developments suggest that the bur-
dens and privileges of shareholders who do not qualify under 
24. See cases cited Annot., 174 A.L.R. 262, 269-71 (1948). Another way in which 
shareholders who are not qualified under the statute may obtain access is by aggrega-
tion. While some statutes do expressly specify that a shareholder may satisfy the re-
quirement by aggregating authorizations from other shareholders, e.g., FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 608.39 (1955); LA. REV. SrAT. ANN. § 12:38 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art 23, § 51 
· (1957); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1315(a), other statutes make no reference to aggrega-
tion, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, 157.45 (Supp. 1965); MICH. COMP. LAws § 450.45 
(1948); TEXAS Bus. CORP. Am: ANN. art. 2.44 (1956); WIS. STAT. § 180.43 (1957). In juris-
dictions of the latter type, aggregation has sometimes been allowed by judicial de-
cision. In Tornga v. Michigan Gas & Elec. Co., 4 Mich. App. 113, 144 N.W.2d 640 (1966), 
the court allowed Tornga to qualify for access under the Michigan statute on the basis 
of stock which he held for the express purpose of making a demand for inspection, but 
in which he had no beneficial interest. 
25. LA. REv. STAT. § 12:38 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 51 (1957); MICH. CoMP. 
LAws § 450.45 (1948). The reason for this restriction would seem to be to protect 
corporations from interlopers by barring access to unqualified stockholders who are in 
effect conclusively presumed to be without good motive. See WILGUS, MICHIGAN CoRPO• 
RATION LAw 334 (2d ed. 1950). Before a 1941 amendment of the Illinois statute, which 
amendment provided that, irrespective of the time or percentage requirement, any 
stockholder could obtain access upon demonstration of proper purpose, 1 Ill. Laws 
1941, at 421, § 1, an Illinois court had held that, without fulfilling the time or per-
centage requirement, a stockholder could not obtain access to corporation records 
under Illinois law. Nieman v. Templeton, Kenley & Co., 294 Ill. App. 45, 13 N.E.2d 
290 (1938). 
26. One method which the courts have used to deny access to those who are ap• 
parently absolutely qualified is to read into the statute an implied condition that 
the applicant have a proper purpose. See cases cited Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11, 18-20 
(1951). Also, since the right to the stocklist is usually enforced by an order in the 
nature of a writ of mandamus, courts frequently deny qualified shareholders access 
to the list by reference to the discretionary nature of the remedy. For example, see 
Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp., 59 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933), where 
the court stated that it would not issue a writ of mandamus, although the statutory 
right was apparently unconditional, where the petitioner was "actuated by corrupt 
or unlawful motives." In some jurisdictions, however, language may be found to 
the effect that the right is absolute. In Henry v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 196 N.Y. 
302, 305, 89 N.E. 942, 943 (1909), the court reasoned that while the legislature could 
have made the stockholder's privilege of inspection dependant upon the motive or 
purpose for which it is sought, the legislature did not do so, and that, in the ab-
sence of any expressly conditional language, the statute should create an absolute 
right in the stockholder and impose an absolute duty on the corporation. However, 
later New York cases have recognized that the remedy is discretionary. E.g., Tate v. 
Sonotone Corp., 272 App. Div. 103, 69 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1947). In Gittlin, the New York 
Supreme Court still speaks of an absolute right, Gittlin v. Studebaker Corp., 49 Misc. 
2d 964, 965, 268 N.Y.S.2d 897, 898 (1966), but this would seem to be contrary to the 
great weight of authority both in New York and elsewhere. See Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 
11, 17·20 (1951). 
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the statutes remain essentially as they were under the common law 
and that qualified shareholders are benefited less than might appear 
from the statutory language; for the latter group, the net effect of 
the legislation is only to relieve them from the burden of showing, 
in the first instance, that they seek access for a proper purpose.21 
The result in Gittlin further dilutes the right which the legislature 
intended to create in qualified shareholders, for it deprives such 
shareholders of the use of authorizations, unless, in obtaining these 
authorizations, the shareholders comply with the proxy rules. 
Another significant consequence of the Gittlin decision is that 
the Second Circuit, by declining to consider the merits of the 
SEC's expansive interpretation of the proxy rules, may have done 
more than merely postpone until another occasion the broad ques-
tion of the extent of the SEC's power to regulate solicitations and 
the narrower question of whether the proxy rules cover a solicita-
tion of an authorization for stocklists when the solicitor has no 
plan which includes proxy solicitations. The practical effect of the 
decision may well be an affirmance of the SEC's position that all 
solicitations of stocklist authorizations are covered by the regula-
tions. Indeed, it may, in fact, result in the SEC's having the power 
to regulate almost all situations involving communications with 
stockholders.28 Consider the situation in which a stocklist is needed 
in order to extend tender offers to shareholders. Here, the offeror's 
plan may be to purchase a controlling interest in the corporation 
and thereby avoid the necessity of soliciting proxies to obtain con-
trol. When he solicits stocklist authorizations, the offeror must de-
cide whether he will comply with the SEC's interpretation that its 
rules cover any authorization for one person to act on behalf of 
another, or whether the rules are, in fact, limited by the facts of 
Okin and Gittlin to situations involving future plans to solicit 
proxies. It is recognized that the Commission has only infrequently 
used the courts to enforce its decision that particular proxy materials 
do not comply with its rules.29 However, the Commission is usually 
successful in obtaining compliance with its views through what has 
been called "the leverage of 'supervisory power.' "3° Certainly in 
27. See 2 ABA·ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. § 46, 1J 4 (1960). 
28. The SEC has apparently recognized that certain communications to stock-
holders do not amount to solicitations. These include the distribution of semi-annual 
and quarterly reports, communications containing information and comments of a 
character normally sent to stockholders by the corporate management during the 
course of the fiscal year, the furnishing of a form of proxy to a stockholder upon 
his unsolicited request, and the publication of news stories quoting contending parties 
or containing editorial comments. See 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 872-74 (2d ed. 
1961). 
29. From 1934 to 1955 the SEC appeared as a party litigant in only seventeen 
cases involving the proxy rules and as an amicus curiae in only eleven. Hearings on 
Banking and Currency, supra note 6, at 1543-44. 
30. The supervisory power is the power of an administrative agency to coerce 
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the tender offer situation the solicitor knows that if his tender offers 
fail and he is therefore forced to resort to a proxy contest to obtain 
control, he must then deal with the Commission. The rules provide 
that he must file proxy material with the Commission ten days prior 
to mailing, but the Commission may, in its discretion, accelerate 
its review of the material, and often such acceleration is a vital fac-
tor in the timing of a proxy campaign.31 If the solicitor had failed 
to comply with the SEC's interpretation that its rules cover author-
izations to obtain a stocklist even absent a plan to solicit proxies, 
the Commission might not be willing to grant his request for an 
accelerated review. Surely, realization of this possibility would dic-
tate compliance with the Commission's position. An additional rea• 
son for compliance is that, since expeditious timing is of great im-
portance, the solicitor cannot risk the delay which might arise be-
cause of possible litigation with the Commission or corporate man-
agement over the questions left unanswered by the Gittlin court. 
Furthermore, such litigation might be disadvantageous from the 
standpoint of corporate politics, for even if the court rejected the 
Commission's interpretation of the coverage of the proxy rules, the 
court battle might produce allegations and publicity that would 
cause shareholders to question the motives of the solicitor. An aware-
ness of the fact that his chances for success in a proxy campaign 
might be diminished by such suspicion would also, in all prob-
ability, prompt the solicitor to comply with the SEC's position. The 
above discussion suggests, at least, that the thesis of extra-legal 
"supervisory power" is applicable in the present situation, and that 
the court's failure in the principal case to consider the full breadth 
of the SEC's interpretation of its powers may well have the effect 
of enabling the SEC to enforce its position, and indeed even a 
broader interpretation of its authority, regardless of its legal under-
pinnings. Moreover, since careful solicitors of authorizations will 
probably comply with the proxy rules rather than risk litigation, 
the position of the SEC may long stand untested in the courts. 
The net effect of Gittlin is that the court may have sacrificed 
certain rights of a potential insurgent in order to assure other stock-
holders that they will receive what the SEC considers to be the 
minimum amount of information which is necessary for the making 
of decisions relating to stocklist authorizations. But, since these au-
a regulated party by methods other than adjudication of rule making. It is a 
concomitant of, an outgrowth from, and a substitute for the prosecuting power. 
In some of the most effective regulatory agencies, perhaps nine tenths or more of 
the desired results are produced through exertion of the supervisory power. 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE I.Aw § 4.01 (1959). The "leverage of 'supervisory power'" is 
discussed by von Mehren and McCarroll in The Proxy Rules, A Case Study in the 
Administrative Process, 29 I.Aw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 728, 744-45 (1964). 
31. See ARANow & EINHORN, PROXY CONT.ESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 128-29 
(1957). See generally DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 30, § 4.01. 
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thorizations neither commit the stockholder nor represent his en-
dorsement of any corporate policy, it is debatable whether stocklist 
authorizations merit the full protection afforded by the proxy rules. 
Yet the broad language of Okin certainly covers the Gittlin facts. 
A possible basis for distinguishing between Okin and the principal 
case might be that the solicitor in Okin apparently communicated 
with all of the shareholders of the corporation, whereas in securing 
authorizations from holders of more than five per cent of the out-
standing shares of Studebaker (which had approximately 110,000 
shareholders), Gittlin needed to obtain authorizations from only 
forty-two people. It is not known how many additional persons were 
solicited unsuccessfully, but undoubtedly the solicitation was highly 
selective. Arguably this distinction, coupled with the fact that no 
decision on corporate policy was requested, warrants a result in 
Gittlin contrary to that reached in Okin. 
On the other hand, both the SEC, in its letter to the court in 
the principal case,32 and Learned Hand, in the Okin opinion,33 
maintained that failure to regulate communications to stockholders 
at an early point in the development of a potential proxy contest 
might result in a preconditioning of the stockholders and that this 
influence would be beyond the reach of subsequent regulation and 
therefore pervade the entire proxy contest. At least in the context 
of the principal case, this argument appears unconvincing. As an 
incident of its regulation of actual proxy solicitations, the Commis-
sion could require that prior inaccurate statements be corrected.34 
This would mean that no party considering engaging in a proxy 
contest could afford to be inaccurate or dishonest in the first in-
stance, since he would later have to make admissions to the effect 
that he had deceived or misled stock.holders when he solicited their 
stocklist authorizations. 
The policy underlying access to stocklists presents another argu-
ment against the application of the Okin rationale to the factual 
situation presented in Gittlin. To permit the SEC to exercise its 
regulatory powers in this area might give irresponsible management 
additional weapons with which to frustrate the attempts of capable 
and responsible opposition to gain control of a corporation. Under 
the Gittlin rule, management may maintain that the solicitations 
for stocklist authorizations are false and misleading or otherwise 
violative of the rules.35 Hearings on such questions will obviously 
32. See note 14 supra. 
33. SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943). 
34. Such a requirement would certainly seem to be within the broad sweep of 
the enabling legislation contained in § 14(a), for it would be "necessary or appro-
priate • • • for the protection of investors," and the requirement would be imposed 
in the context of an undisputable solicitation of proxies. 
35. The SEC can only exercise effective review of proxy material which on its 
face or on the basis of the Commission's information evidences a failure of the 
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create difficulties for an insurgent. Indeed, in some cases, obstacles 
arising from a requirement that he provide the other stock.holders 
with information may so inhibit well qualified opposition as to de-
stroy his campaign. Furthermore, the Gittlin result, while consistent 
with Congress' intent that the shareholder be informed before giv-
ing authorizations,36 apparently conflicts with another of the his-
torical purposes of the proxy rules: the elimination of various 
abuses perpetrated by self-perpetuating management.37 
It would seem, then, that the court might have attempted to 
distinguish Gittlin from Okin and thus allow regulation of stocklist 
authorizations to remain a matter of state law.38 Had it done so, in 
those jurisdictions where the court has the discretion to order a 
corporation to open its stocklist but management has the opportu-
nity to prove that a solicitor's motive is improper, management's 
interest in preventing access to the stocklist would apparently ade-
quately protect the shareholder. In those few jurisdictions where the 
shareholder's statutory right might be considered absolute, if in 
fact there are any,39 legislation could be enacted to offer protection 
to the other shareholders. For example, to prevent abuse by those 
who have an absolute right, but who, because of their motives, could 
not have obtained a discretionary order, state legislatures could re-
quire that before requesting authorizations, solicitors must post a 
bond. By analogy to the "security for expenses" statute applicable 
to derivative suits,40 such bonds would be forfeited if the motives 
party who has submitted the material to comply with the proxy rules. Hearings on 
Banking and Currency, supra note 6, at 1045-46. Consequently, the assistance of the 
party against whom the communication is directed in bringing information to the 
attention of the Commission is of considerable importance. 
36. In order that the shareholder may have adequate knowledge as to the 
manner in which his interests are being served, it is essential that he be en-
lightened not only as to the financial condition of the corporation, but also as 
to the major considerations of policy which are decided at shareholders meet• 
ings. Too often proxies are solicited without explanation to the shareholders of 
the real nature of the question for which authority to cast his vote is sought. 
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934). 
37. Managements of properties owned by the investing public should not be 
permitted to perpetuate themselves by the misuse of corporate proxies. Insiders 
having little or no substantial interest in the properties they manage have often 
retained control without an adequate disclosure of their interest and without an 
adequate explanation of the management policies they intend to pursue. Insiders 
have at times solicited proxies without fairly informing the stockholders of the 
purposes for which the proxies are to be used and have used such proxies to 
take from the stockholders for their own selfish advantage valuable property 
rights. 
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934). 
38. But see 42 NOTRE DAME LAw 84, 91 (1966), which, without analysis of the 
particular policies at work in the context of stocklist authorizations, concludes that 
Gittlin should fall within the scope of § 14(a) through an application of the broad 
principal laid down in Okin. 
39. See note 26 supra. 
40. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. Acr § 627. 
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underlying the request for access were subsequently discovered to 
be improper. 
The Gittlin result, requiring that those seeking stocklist author-
izations comply with the proxy rules, is neither the sole nor the best 
means of protecting stockholders. It provides barriers to the exer-
cise of state conferred statutory rights designed to facilitate access 
to stocklists; it saddles the insurgents with burdens imposed by the 
agency; and it is in conflict with one of the basic aims of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act: to increase the possibility of outsider participa-
tion in corporate affairs so as to prevent entrenched management 
from pursuing policies contrary to the best interests of the stock-
holders. 
